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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE RECORD ON APPEAL DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW BY MODIFYING THE CHILD CUSTODY PROVISION OF
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THE DIVORCE DECREE AND AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO MR. HANSON.
The arguments presented by Mr. Hanson neither rebut nor
address the issues raised on appeal.

Instead, without due regard

to established case law and the attendant legal principles to be
utilized in guiding child custody determinations, he attempts to
simply argue that the trial court=s decision amounts to the best
interests of the children.

Nevertheless, the record on appeal

demonstrates that the trial court not only abused its discretion
but erred as a matter of law in the course of its child custody
determination.
A. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing
to Give Considerable Weight to the Primary Caregiver
Factor.
This Court, in Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), articulated a number of factors to be considered by the
trial court in performing the best-interests-of-the-child analysis
prior to making a child custody determination:
The need for stability in custodial relationship
and environment; maintaining an existing primary
custodial bond; the relative strength of parental
bonds[;] [t]he relative abilities of the parents
to provide care, supervision, and a suitable
environment for the children and to meet the needs
of the children; [p]reference of a child able to
evaluate the custody question; [t]he benefits of
keeping siblings together, enabling sibling bonds
to form; [t]he character and emotional stability
of the custodian; and [t]he desire for custody;
the apparent commitment of the proposed custodian
to parenting.
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).1 While the trial court may consider
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many factors in the course of its best-interests-of-the- child
analysis, each is not on equal footing.
UT App 290, &26, 989 P.2d 491.

Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999

Generally, the trial court

possesses the discretion to determine, based on the specific facts
before it and within the constructs established by the appellate
courts, where a particular factor falls within the spectrum of
relevant importance and its appropriate weight.

See Davis v.

Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d
942, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999).

However, the importance of the multitude of factors used

in determining a child=s best interests Aranges from the possibly
relevant to the critically important.@
&26.

Hudema, 1999 UT App 290 at

AAt the critically important end of the spectrum, when the

child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, lies continuity of
placement.@

Id. (citing Davis, 749 P.2d at 648 (AIn considering

competing claims to custody between fit parents under the >best
interests of the child= standard, considerable weight should be
given to which parent has been the child=s primary caregiver.@);
Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (A[T]rial
courts must examine a child=s need for stability, and therefore,
consider prior custody arrangements, and the potential harm to the
child if the arrangement is changed.@).
In this case, the trial court erred as a matter of law by
failing to give considerable weight to the primary caregiver
factor.

This is demonstrated by the trial court=s Memorandum

Decision, in which it stated the following:
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Mr. Peterson[, the custody evaluator,] found that
[Ms. Hanson] had been the >children=s primary care
giver= and she appears to do a good job of meeting
their basic needs.@ However, the Court does not
put much weight on the determination that [Ms.
Hanson] is the primary care giver because her
being in Louisiana necessitates this fact.
(R. 448, &34). This statement, while demonstrating the trial
court=s failure, as a matter of law, to duly consider Ms. Hanson=s
status as the primary caregiver, also inaccurately portrayed Ms.
Hanson

solely

Louisiana.

as

the

primary

caregiver

while

residing

in

At the time to trial, Ms. Hanson had been the primary

caregiver for essentially the children=s entire lives, not to
mention since the divorce in October 2001 (R. 45, &2).
Further guidance is provided in Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599
(Utah 1989), where the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Nevertheless,
if
an
existing
custody
arrangement is not inimical to the child, the
continuity and stability of the arrangement are
factors to be weighed in determining a child=s
best interests. What particular weight to be
accorded those factors in a given case must
depend on the duration of the initial custody
arrangement, the age of the child, the nature
of the relationship that has developed between
the child and the custodial and noncustodial
parents, and how well the child is thriving
physically, mentally, and emotionally. A very
short custody arrangement of a few months, even
if nurturing to some extent, is not entitled to
as much weight as a similar arrangement of
substantial duration.
Of course, a lengthy
custody arrangement in which a child has
thrived ought rarely, if at all, to be
disturbed, and then only if the circumstances
are compelling.2
Id. at 604 (citation omitted and emphasis added). In addition to
Elmer, other Utah Supreme Court cases dictate that stability is a
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fundamental consideration in original custody awards as well as
subsequent modifications. For example, in Pusey v. Pusey, 728
P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Court stated that decisive factors in
child custody determinations should be function related, and
include

the

Aidentity

of

the

primary

caretaker

during

the

marriage.@ Id. at 120. The Court in Pusey also stated that another
factor to be considered is the Aidentity of the parent with whom
the child has spent most of his or her time pending custody
determination if that period is lengthy.@ Id.
Another

example

evincing

the

importance

of

the

primary

caregiver factor is found in Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah
1988), where the father had custody of the child for over a year
prior to trial on the issue of permanent custody.

The trial court

considered a number of factors, including the stable environment
provided by the father, and that he had been the primary caretaker
during the interim period.
award

to

the

father,

In the course of affirming the custody

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

stated,

AIn

considering competing claims to custody between fit parents under
the >best interests of the child= standard, considerable weight
should be given to which parent has been the child=s primary
caregiver.@

Id. at 648 (emphasis added).

The trial court, in the case at bar, stated that it did Anot
put much weight on the determination that [Ms. Hanson] is the
primary care giver because her being in Louisiana necessitates
this fact.@ (R. 448, &34). As demonstrated by the record, the
trial court explicitly disregarded the undisputed facts that the
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children had resided with Ms. Hanson for well over five years
prior to the custody trial, that the children progressed well in
the Louisiana environment (R. 599:96-97; R. 599:97:13-20).

The

record also demonstrates that the trial court basically ignored
not only the factor of stability, and discounted, if not ignored,
the potential harm to the children that would result if a change
in the lengthy custody arrangement with their mother occurred (R.
599:83:15-21; 599:104:7-11).
In the course of trial, on direct examination by Mr. Hanson=s
counsel,

Mr.

Peterson,

the

custody

evaluator,

testified

as

follows:
I do not feel that there is sufficient
justification to say - grant dad custody. They
have a very significant bond with their mother.
She=s a good mother.
She=s responsible and I
can=t for the life of me in weighing each one of
their strengths or weaknesses say that based on
parenting skills alone that dad would be the
preferable parent. Dad was a very good parent
too. He=s had some problems in the past. He=s
grown up a lot in the last few years, he=s really
matured and the children have become much more
of a priority to him.
(R. 599:83:15-24).

In addition, he testified that the children

are Ahappy and well adjusted in their mother=s home@ and that he
would not recommend removing the children from their mother=s
custody inasmuch as Athey would be stressed.@ (R. 599:97:13-15; R.
599:104:7-11).
In fact, in response to questioning performed by the district
court, itself, concerning the possible removal of the children
from their mother, Mr. Peterson adamantly testified, AWell, I
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would not remove the children from their mother.
that.

I=m opposed to

So I=m not talking about leaving mom in Louisiana and

having

the

kids

come

here.

I

do

not

support

that.@

(R.

599:112:111-12).
Perhaps even more telling is the failure of Mr. Hanson to
even mention in his Brief this Court=s case of Larsen v. Larsen,
888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), a case that is eerily similar
to the case at bar.

In Larsen, father and mother were divorced

after nine years of marriage and three children, with mother
receiving by way of stipulated settlement custody of the children.
Id. at 721.

Shortly after the divorce, mother decided to move

with the children to Oregon where she intended to marry her
fiancé.

Id.

Father filed a petition to modify custody because he

believed that the move would inhibit his relationship with the
children, disrupt the children=s religious training, and remove
them from their family and friends.

Id.

The trial court granted

the petition, ordering that if mother moved from Summit County,
Utah, physical custody of the children would transfer to father.
Id. at 721-22.

On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court=s

modification, concluding that there was not compelling evidence
that residing in Summit County would be better for the children
than allowing them to continue to reside with their life-long
primary caregiver.

Id. at 723, 727.

Similar to Larsen, the trial court in the instant case
determined that the children should be removed from the custody of
9

their mother and placed in their father=s custody if, and only if,
their mother were to reside Ain Salt Lake County, or a nearby
county within reasonable distance (less than 150 miles)@ of their
father=s residence.

Based on the trial court=s analysis and

findings, the court=s ruling basically means that the it believed
the children=s domicile in Salt Lake County is so essential to
their welfare that not residing there would be more detrimental
than separating them from their life-long primary caregiver.

In

light of the previously mentioned case law, statutory law, and
legal principles, the record on appeal is devoid of a compelling
reason why residing in Salt Lake County or thereabouts would be
better for the children than allowing them to reside with their
life-long primary caregiver where they undisputedly thrived and
flourished.
The trial court, in the course of its ruling, focused on the
children being in close proximity to extended family in Utah.
While

this

factor

is

an

consideration, Athis, by

appropriate

factor

for

the

court=s

itself, is insufficient to disturb a

previously established custody arrangement in which the children
are happy and well-adjusted.@

Id. at 726.

In fact, according to

Utah case law, this factor, on the spectrum of relevant and
important factors, is at the less significant end of the spectrum.
See Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, &36, 989 P.2d 491.
As in Larsen, it is undisputed that Mr. Hanson is and can
continue

to

be

a

positive

factor

in

the

children=s

lives.

Addressing this, the evaluator stated that sharing longer blocks
10

of time together,3 in contrast to more frequent visitation, could
facilitate relationships between Mr. Hanson and the children.
B.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by
Failing to Enter Specific, Detailed Findings
Supporting its Child Custody Determination.
Besides what appear to be broad generalizations, Mr. Hanson
fails to address how the trial court=s analysis and findings in
this case are defective in several respects. There is essentially
no

reference

by

the

trial

court

to

the

evaluator=s

adamant

recommendation and insistence that the children not be removed
from their mother.

The trial court=s findings also failed to

consider undisputed evidence of the children=s Avery significant
bond with their mother@, Ms. Hanson=s lengthy status as the primary
caregiver, and the evidence that the children thrived while living
with their mother in Louisiana.
abuse of discretion.

These omissions constitute an

4

The trial court also ignored Mr. Peterson=s warnings of the
negative impact to the children if they were removed from their
mother.

In fact, the expert testimony of Mr. Peterson as well as

his recommendation expressly preponderated in favor of continuing
custody at the very least with Ms. Hanson in some fashion or
another.

The trial court gave little of no explanation for its

refusal to follow this recommendation.
court

is

appointed

not

bound

evaluator],

to
.

accept
.

.

the
some

recommendation . . . is in order.@

A[A]lthough the trial

evaluation
reason

for

[of

the

court

rejecting

the

Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922,

925-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d
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88, 91 (Utah 1982)).

Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Hanson,

the record demonstrates that the court=s disregard of the need for
consistency

and

stability,

especially

given

the

rather

even

parenting abilities, constitutes an improper application of the
law and a resulting abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Hanson respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court=s modification
ruling

and

remand

the

case

to

the

trial

court

for

further

proceedings consistent with the Court=s opinion, including a
reconsideration of her request for reasonable attorney fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 2009.
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.

________________________
Scott L Wiggins
Counsel for Appellant
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ADDENDA
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(11).
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